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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this appeal, we must determine the validity of 
Treas. Reg. § 1.58-9 (1992).  Specifically, the issue is whether 
the Department of the Treasury may implement a "suspended-tax" 
approach instead of a "suspended-preference" method in 
calculating minimum tax under the "tax benefit rule" of former 
I.R.C. § 58(h), 26 U.S.C.  The first approach computes and 
suspends tax liability until a benefit results while the latter 
suspends items of tax preference.  Because we find the suspended-
tax approach to be a reasonable construction of § 58(h), in 
accord with its language and purpose, we will uphold the 
regulation.  
 I. 
 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, Conoco, Inc., 
Remington Arms Company, and New England Nuclear Corp.1 filed 
                     
1.   New England Nuclear Corp. (NEN) merged into DuPont 
after the 1981 taxable year, the year of the alleged deficiency 
against NEN.   
 
 
federal income tax returns for 1979, 1980, and 1981,2 claiming 
reductions in tax liability through the use of income tax credits 
carried back from the 1982 tax year.  Subsequently, the Internal 
Revenue Service issued notices of deficiency to taxpayers for 
$25,633,133.  Taxpayers responded by filing petitions in the Tax 
Court, contending the regulation on which the deficiencies were 
based exceeded the scope of the authorizing statute, I.R.C. § 
58(h).3  The Tax Court sustained the regulation, E.I. Du Pont De 
Nemours & Co. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 1 (T.C. 1994), and 
taxpayers appealed.4  We will affirm. 
 A. 
 In 1969, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 56(a) out of concern 
over the use of tax deductions and exemptions that enabled some 
high-income taxpayers to pay little or no income tax.5  Section 
                     
2.   In 1982, DuPont filed a consolidated federal income tax 
return on behalf of itself and its affiliates, including Conoco, 
Remington, and E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, as successor to 
NEN.  Conoco, Remington, and NEN were not affiliates of DuPont 
for the taxable years covered by the 1979-81 returns, however, 
and each entity therefore filed its own return.  Furthermore, 
while DuPont and Conoco filed tax returns on behalf of their 
affiliated corporations, we will refer to the tax returns as 
having been filed by DuPont and Conoco. 
3.   The law relevant to this appeal changed significantly 
in 1986.  See infra note 38.  Unless otherwise noted, citations 
to former I.R.C. §§ 56 and 58(h) will be to the 1982 version of 
the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 
4.   DuPont, for itself and as successor to NEN, and 
Remington filed this appeal.  Conoco, which has its principal 
place of business in Texas, has an appeal pending before the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.  Conoco, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, No. 94-40382. 
5.   See H.R. Rep. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st. Sess., pt. 1, 
at 2 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1646 ("Under 
 
 
56(a) imposed a minimum tax, apart from the regular income tax, 
on certain deductions and exemptions designated as "items of tax 
preference."6  During the years relevant to this case, the 
statute levied a minimum tax of 15% of the amount by which the 
(..continued) 
your committee's bill, virtually no individual with significant 
amounts of income will be able to escape payment of all 
tax. . . .   The second line of defense is to group remaining tax 
preference items and impose a minimum tax or a limit on tax 
preferences."); S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 112 
(1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2143 ("the committee 
believes that an overall minimum tax on tax preferences is also 
needed to reduce the advantages derived from these preferences 
and to make sure that those receiving such preferences also pay a 
share of the tax burden").  See also First Chicago Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 842 F.2d 180, 181 (7th Cir. 1988) ("The purpose of 
minimum tax (original or alternative) is to make sure that the 
aggregating of tax-preference items does not result in the 
taxpayer's paying a shockingly low percentage of his income as 
tax."); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 685 F.2d 
1346, 1350 (Cl. Ct. 1982) (Occidental I) ("The legislative 
history, to us, reflects a Congressional concern for the way the 
tax code is perceived by the general public. . . .  In order to 
prevent the system from seeming inequitable, individuals and 
corporations with large incomes should not be able to avoid 
entirely the payment of domestic taxes.").  
6.   Items of tax preference, defined in I.R.C. § 57 (1982), 
represented: 
 
 income of a person which either is not 
subject to current taxation by reason of 
temporary exclusion (such as stock options) 
or by reason of an acceleration of deductions 
(such as accelerated depreciation) or is 
sheltered from full taxation by reason of 
certain deductions (such as percentage 
depletion) or by reason of a special rate of 
tax (such as the rate of tax on corporate 
capital gains). 
 
T.D. 7564, 1978-2 C.B. 19, 23.  Tax preferences continue to be 
defined in the current Internal Revenue Code, albeit in modified 
form.  I.R.C. § 57 (1988 & Supp. 1994). 
 
 
taxpayer's preferences exceeded its regular tax deduction7 or 
$10,000, whichever was greater. 
 In some situations, however, tax preferences did not 
result in a current tax benefit for the taxpayer.  For example, a 
taxpayer's tax liability could be completely offset by income tax 
credits, which were not designated as preferences.  Yet, even in 
those cases in which tax preferences did not result in an actual 
benefit, such as when a taxpayer had enough tax credits to reduce 
its tax liability to zero, the minimum tax still was imposed.    
See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 685 F.2d 1346 
(Cl. Ct. 1982) (Occidental I). 
 To remedy this perceived unfairness, Congress enacted a 
new provision, I.R.C. § 58(h), in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 301(d)(3), 90 Stat. 1520, 1553 (1976).8  
I.R.C. § 58(h) provided: 
                     
7.   The "regular tax deduction" equaled income tax 
liability, including investment tax credit recapture, reduced by 
certain tax credits.  I.R.C. § 56(c).  
8.   The Joint Committee on Taxation explained the reason 
for § 58(h): 
 
  There are certain cases in which a 
person derives no tax benefit from an item of 
tax preference because, for example, the item 
is disallowed as a deduction under other 
provisions of the Code or because the 
taxpayer has sufficient deductions relating 
to nonpreference items to eliminate his 
taxable income. . . .  To deal with this 
problem specifically, the Act instructs the 
Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe 
regulations under which items of tax 
preference (of both individuals and 
corporations) are to be properly adjusted 
when the taxpayer does not derive any tax 
 
 
 Regulations to include tax benefit rule 
  The Secretary shall prescribe 
regulations under which items of tax 
preference shall be properly adjusted where 
the tax treatment giving rise to such items 
will not result in the reduction of the 
taxpayer's tax under this subtitle for any 
taxable years. 
Despite the express statutory directive, the Department of the 
Treasury failed to propose implementing regulations for thirteen 
years.9  In the meantime, Congress repealed § 58(h) in 1986 and 
adopted an alternative minimum tax,10 although it later noted 
(..continued) 
benefit from the preference.  For this 
purpose, a tax benefit includes tax deferral, 
even if only for one year. 
  
H.R. Rep. No. 10612, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 106-07 (1976) 
(footnote omitted), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 118-19.  See also 
First Chicago Corp., 842 F.2d at 181 ("[S]ection 56(a) would 
impose minimum tax on tax-preference items even though the items 
never conferred a tax benefit on the taxpayer. . . .  The sparse 
legislative history as well as the text of section 58(h) 
indicates that this section was added in order to prevent these 
anomalous consequences."); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. 
Commissioner, 82 T.C. 819, 824 (T.C. 1984) (Occidental II) 
("Plainly, in enacting section 58(h), Congress was concerned 
about not imposing the minimum tax on tax preferences where such 
tax preferences did not result in a tax benefit.").  
9.   Courts have noted the interpretative difficulties 
caused by the Treasury's delay in issuing regulations under § 
58(h).  See First Chicago Corp., 842 F.2d at 182 ("These and 
other questions might have been answered if the Treasury 
Department had ever gotten around to promulgating regulations 
under section 58(h), as ordered to do by Congress, but it never 
did, blaming its default on a staggering workload . . . ."); 
Occidental II, 82 T.C. at 829 ("[T]he failure to promulgate the 
required regulations can hardly render the new provisions of 
section 58(h) inoperative.  We must therefore do the best we can 
with these new provisions.").  
10.   The Tax Reform Act of 1986 replaced the remnants of the 
add-on minimum tax with an alternative minimum tax for taxable 
years after 1986.  Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 
 
 
that § 58(h) would continue to apply to tax years preceding the 
1986 statutory change.11  
 B. 
 In 1989, the Treasury Department issued a temporary 
regulation to implement § 58(h).12  Three years later, the 
department promulgated a final version of the regulation, 26 
C.F.R. § 1.58-9, applicable only to preferences arising in 
taxable years from 1977 to 1986, when the statute was in effect.  
Id. § 1.58-9(b).  Under the regulation, as specified by § 58(h), 
a taxpayer is not liable for the minimum tax on its preferences 
when they result in no current tax benefit, such as when the 
taxpayer has sufficient credits to offset tax liability for the 
year without deducting any available preferences. 
 Operation of the statute and regulation, however, 
results in an unavoidable secondary effect.  When tax credits 
exceed regular tax liability for a year, the taxpayer is deemed 
to have received no current tax benefit and no minimum tax is 
imposed.  Yet, the taxpayer still calculates regular tax 
liability by deducting its preferences.  Because the resulting 
regular tax liability is lower than it otherwise would be without 
(..continued) 
701, 100 Stat. 2085, 2320-45 (1986) (codified as amended at 
I.R.C. §§ 55-59 (1988)). 
11.   The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. 
No. 101-239, title VII, § 7811(d)(1)(B), 103 Stat. 2106, 2408 
(1989), provided that: "The repeal of section 58(h) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 shall 
be effective only with respect to items of tax preference arising 
in taxable years beginning after December 31, 1986." 
12.   Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.58-9T (1989).  
 
 
the inclusion of the preferences, fewer credits are necessary to 
offset the taxpayer's tax liability for the year.  Because tax 
credits may be carried over from year to year, the need for fewer 
tax credits to offset tax liability in one year "frees up" 
additional credits for use in other years.   
 If the taxpayer does not use those "freed-up" tax 
credits to reduce regular tax liability in any year, then it 
never benefits from the preferences; thus, no minimum tax may be 
imposed.  See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 
819 (T.C. 1984) (Occidental II).  If the taxpayer later uses 
those freed-up credits, however, then it has benefitted from the 
preferences and must pay the minimum tax.  Treas. Reg. § 1.58-9.  
All parties agree with this conclusion.  The dispute centers on 




 For the 1982 tax year, DuPont filed a consolidated 
federal income tax return for itself and its affiliates -- 
including Conoco, Remington, and NEN -- showing taxable income of 
$629,112,639.  DuPont claimed tax preferences of $177,082,305, 
which reduced its tax liability to $256,844,566.  Without the use 
of preferences to compute taxable income, DuPont's tax liability 
would have been $338,302,426.13  Because DuPont had $469,997,179 
in credits -- more than enough to offset the potential tax 
liability of $338,302,426 -- it was not subject to minimum tax 
for the year, pursuant to I.R.C. § 58(h).  See First Chicago 
Corp. v. Commissioner, 842 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 Nevertheless, because DuPont claimed the preferences in 
1982 to reduce its taxable income and subsequent tax liability,14 
it saved $81,457,86015 in credits for use in other years.  DuPont 
carried back those freed-up credits and applied them to its own 
return for the 1979 tax year and to individual returns filed by 
                     
13.   The $338,302,426 in potential tax liability is 
calculated by multiplying the $177,082,305 in preferences by the 
marginal tax rate of 46 percent from I.R.C. § 11(b)(5) (1982).  
The result, $81,457,860, is then added to the $256,844,566 in 
regular tax liability computed after deducting the preferences 
from taxable income.    
14.   After being offset by its tax credits, DuPont's zero 
tax liability actually increased to $5,626,409 because of the 
recapture of investment tax credits, which could not be offset by 
credits. 
15.   See supra note 13.    
 
 
Conoco, Remington, and NEN, which were not affiliated at the time 
with DuPont.16 
 Under Treas. Reg. § 1.58-9, the minimum tax constitutes 
15% of the difference between the taxpayer's tax preferences and 
its regular tax deduction for the year in which the preferences 
arose, here 1982.  The regulation requires that credits freed up 
by the preferences in one year must be reduced by the amount of 
the minimum tax before being carried over to other tax years.  
In this case, § 1.58-9 mandated that the freed-up DuPont credits 
of $81,457,860 be reduced by $25,633,133, which was 15% of the 
difference between the 1982 preferences of $177,082,305 and the 
1982 regular tax deduction of $6,194,754.17 
 Because DuPont had not reduced the credits pursuant to 
the regulation, the Commissioner assessed the following 
deficiencies: 
 Taxpayer  Taxable Year Ended    Deficiency 
 DuPont  December 31, 1979   $13,010,040 
 Conoco  December 31, 1980    12,436,199 
 Remington  January 31, 1980        78,698 
 NEN   February 28, 1981       108,196 
 
      Total   $25,633,133 
                     
16.   See supra note 2.  DuPont used the tax credits for the 
1979 tax year, Conoco and Remington used the credits for the 1980 
tax year, and NEN used them for the 1981 tax year. 
17.   The regular tax deduction in 1982 was $568,345 more 
than the investment tax credit recapture amount of $5,626,409.  
See supra note 14.  The difference resulted from I.R.C. § 56(c), 
which, in defining the regular tax deduction, excluded from 
offsetting tax credits the Tax Reduction Act Stock Ownership Plan 





 In contrast to the system mandated by the regulation, 
which the Tax Court characterized as the "suspended-tax method," 
taxpayers advocate a "suspended-preference approach."  Du Pont, 
102 T.C. at 6.  In essence, taxpayers' method would suspend the 
preferences -- not the minimum tax -- and treat them as if they 
had arisen during the carry-over year, i.e., the year the freed-
up credits are used.  Those suspended preferences would be 
aggregated with other preferences arising in the carry-over year.  
The minimum tax then would equal 15% of the difference between 
the aggregated preferences and the regular tax deduction for the 
carry-over year.  Under taxpayer's method, DuPont, Remington, and 
NEN would have no minimum tax liability, and the deficiency 
against Conoco would be reduced to $10,551,95618 -- instead of 
the $25,633,133 total deficiency assessed under Treas. Reg. § 
1.58-9. 
 Accordingly, taxpayers filed petitions in the Tax Court 
claiming the deficiencies were based on an invalid regulation.  
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disagreed, and all parties 
submitted a fully stipulated record to the Tax Court, which 
upheld Treas. Reg. § 1.58-9 as a reasonable interpretation of the 
statute.  Du Pont, 102 T.C. at 20-21.  Taxpayers then appealed.19 
 The Tax Court had jurisdiction of the case under I.R.C. 
§§ 6214(a) and 7442 (1988).  We have jurisdiction under I.R.C. § 
                     
18.   For detailed calculations of the minimum tax under 
taxpayers' proposed system, see Du Pont, 102 T.C. at 7-8.  
19.   See supra note 4. 
 
 
7482 (1988), and our review is plenary.  Pleasant Summit Land 
Corp. v. Commissioner, 863 F.2d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).   
 II. 
 As an initial matter, we consider the judicial 
deference to which the regulation is entitled.  Under Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 844 (1984), "legislative regulations are given controlling 
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute."  Taxpayers, however, contend that § 
1.58-9 is not a "legislative" regulation entitled to deference 
under Chevron. 
 Because the Treasury proposed the regulation thirteen 
years after the statute's enactment and three years after its 
repeal, taxpayers argue that § 1.58-9 is not a "legislative" 
regulation issued under I.R.C. § 58(h), but merely an 
"interpretative" one20 under the department's general rule-making 
authority.  See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1988) ("the Secretary shall 
prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement 
                     
20.   In this context, "legislative regulations" are those 
issued pursuant to a specific grant of congressional authority 
"'to define a statutory term or prescribe a method of executing a 
statutory provision,'" while "interpretative regulations" are 
issued under the general grant of authority of I.R.C. § 7805(a).  
See Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 974 F.2d 422, 
430-31 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 
U.S. 247, 253 (1981)).  See also McKnight v. Commissioner, 7 F.3d 
447, 450-51 (5th Cir. 1993); Gehl Co. v. Commissioner, 795 F.2d 
1324, 1328 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 
 
of this title").21  We cannot agree.  I.R.C. § 58(h) provided 
that the "Secretary shall prescribe regulations . . .," which 
appears to be precisely the type of "express delegation of 
authority to the agency" that Chevron contemplates.  467 U.S. at 
843-44.  Although there may be situations in which substantial 
and prejudicial delay in exercising rule-making authority might 
alter the degree of deference accorded a regulation, we see no 
express prejudice here nor do we discern any other factors that 
would change the nature of our review.  In addition, even after 
the repeal of § 58(h), Congress expressly stated that the statute 
would remain effective for preferences arising in taxable years 
before 1987.22  Therefore, the congressional directive for the 
Treasury to "prescribe regulations" under § 58(h) remained in 
force as to those taxable years. 
 Furthermore, in the tax area, we are still required to 
treat regulations issued under a general grant of authority with 
broad deference, although to a somewhat lesser degree than when 
Congress has made a specific delegation of authority in a 
specific statute.23  As the Supreme Court has explained:  
                     
21.   The preamble to Treas. Reg. § 1.58-9 states it was 
issued under the specific statute, I.R.C. § 58(h), and the 
general grant of authority of § 7805.  See T.D. 8416, 1992-1 C.B. 
7, 7, 9. 
22.   See supra note 11. 
23.   See Polychrome Int'l Corp. v. Krigger, 5 F.3d 1522, 
1544 n.53 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting, in discussing the Virgin 
Islands tax code, that courts "owe less deference to an 
interpretative regulation . . . than to one promulgated under a 
specific grant of authority"); Armstrong World Indus., 974 F.2d 
at 430 ("legislative regulations not promulgated under the 
general authority to 'prescribe all needful rules and 
 
 
"Because Congress has delegated to the Commissioner the power to 
promulgate 'all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement 
of [the Internal Revenue Code],' 26 U.S.C. §7805(a), we must 
defer to his regulatory interpretations of the Code so long as 
they are reasonable."  Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 
U.S. 554, 560-61 (1991) (quoting National Muffler Dealers Ass'n 




regulations,' 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a), but instead emanating from a 
specific grant of Congressional authority 'to define a statutory 
term or prescribe a method of executing a statutory provision,' 
are owed an even greater deference") (quoting Rowan Cos., 452 
U.S. at 253).  See also United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 
455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982); McKnight, 7 F.3d at 450-51; Gehl Co., 795 
F.2d at 1328. 
 
 Although this court and others have noted that 
interpretative regulations issued under the Internal Revenue Code 
are entitled to less deference than legislative regulations, it 
is not clear whether this rule applies outside the Internal 
Revenue Code.  So far we have declined to decide whether Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837 (1984), which advises judicial deference to agency 
regulations, overruled General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 
125, 141-42 (1976), which held that an agency's interpretative 
decisions required less judicial deference.  See Sekula v. 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 93-3596, 1994 WL 620836, at *8 
n.13 (3d Cir. Nov. 9, 1994); Reich v. Local 30, Int'l Bhd. of 
Teamsters, 6 F.3d 978, 987 n.14 (3d Cir. 1993); International Raw 
Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 978 F.2d 1318, 1325 n.9 
(3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1588 (1993). 
24.   See also Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co. of Utah, 
450 U.S. 156, 169 (1981) (citations omitted) ("Treasury 
Regulations 'must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly 
inconsistent with the revenue statutes'"); Armstrong World 
Indus., 974 F.2d at 430 (citations omitted) ("we defer to 
treasury regulations that 'implement the congressional mandate in 
some reasonable manner'"). 
 
 
 I.R.C. § 58(h) directs the Treasury to enact 
regulations "under which items of tax preference shall be 
properly adjusted where the tax treatment giving rise to such 
items will not result in the reduction of the taxpayer's tax 
under this subtitle for any taxable years."  On appeal, 
taxpayers' principal contention is that the regulation adjusts 
tax credits, not items of tax preference. 
 Although § 58(h) requires that taxpayers be exempt from 
the minimum tax for any year in which their preferences do not 
result in a tax benefit, the regulation nevertheless computes the 
minimum tax that otherwise would be due on those preferences for 
the year.  The regulation then reduces the taxpayers' tax credits 
by the amount of the minimum tax.  It is only when taxpayers 
attempt to benefit from their preferences -- by using the freed-
up credits -- that they become subject to the tax.  
 Taxpayers complain that the operation of § 1.58-9 
results in adjustments to their tax credits, contrary to the 
language of the statute.  Instead, taxpayers claim the tax should 
be assessed by carrying the preference items from the "non-
benefit" year over to the "benefit" year and combining them with 
the preferences that arose during the latter year.  The minimum 
tax then would equal 15% of the total number of preferences from 
both years subtracted by the benefit year's regular tax 
deduction.  Taxpayers contend this method would adjust actual 
"items of tax preference," as the statute required. 
 Although taxpayers' proposal appears to be reasonable, 
it is not the only permissible construction of the statute, nor 
 
 
is it necessarily the most reasonable one.25  We believe Treas. 
Reg. § 1.58-9 adjusts "items of tax preference" simply by 
ignoring them -- for minimum tax purposes -- during the year when 
no tax benefit is realized.  As we have noted, the purpose of the 
statute was to ensure that no minimum tax be assessed on 
preferences when they did not result in a tax benefit;26 Treas. 
Reg. § 1.58-9 accomplishes this result. 
 B. 
 Taxpayers contend Congress intended a "suspended-
preference approach" be promulgated to implement I.R.C. § 58(h) 
and claim the legislative history of the 1976 Tax Reform Act, 
which adopted § 58(h), supports their construction of the 
statute.  But none of the congressional committee reports on § 
58(h) indicates the method by which the preferences were to be 
adjusted.27  Nevertheless, taxpayers point to one committee 
report discussing other provisions of the Code that specify a 
type of suspension and reactivation of preferences somewhat 
                     
25.   The Commissioner claims the taxpayers' approach would 
violate fundamental principles of the Internal Revenue Code by 
permitting deductions to be shifted from one tax year to another.  
Taxpayers respond that they would adjust preferences only for 
minimum tax purposes, not under the regular tax, and thus the 
integrity of the Code would remain intact.  Because we find the 
Treasury regulation to be a reasonable construction of the 
statute, we need not resolve this issue. 
26.   See supra note 8. 
27.   See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 
I, at 113-14 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3548-
49; H.R. Rep. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 130-32 (1975), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2897, 3025-27. 
 
 
similar to the system they advocate.28  That committee report, 
however, does not explicitly support taxpayers' method of tax 
computation.  Furthermore, as the Commissioner contends, the 
cited Code provisions are not analogous because they suspend tax 
deductions for other purposes,29 not just for minimum tax 
purposes, as does § 58(h).30  
                     
28.   The Joint Committee on Taxation Staff General 
Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 stated: 
 
 There are certain cases in which a person 
derives no tax benefit from an item of tax 
preference because, for example, the item is 
disallowed as a deduction under other 
provisions of the Code or because the 
taxpayer has sufficient deductions relating 




   1For example, preference items giving rise 
to losses which are suspended under at risk 
provisions (sec. 465 or sec. 704(d) of the 
Code) are not to be considered to give rise 
to a tax benefit until the year in which the 
suspended deduction is allowed.  Similarly, 
investment interest which is disallowed 
(under sec. 163(d)) is to be treated as an 
itemized deduction for purposes of that 
preference only in the year in which it is 
allowed (under sec. 163(d)). 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 10612, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 106-07 (1976) 
(footnote omitted), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 118-19. 
29.   See I.R.C. §§ 465, 704(d), 163(d) (1976). 
30.   Taxpayers also contend the regulation is contrary to 
legislative intent because it was issued after Congress failed to 
include in a 1989 statute a proposal to permit the Treasury to 
adjust items other than tax preferences, presumably including tax 
credits.  In excluding this language from the final bill, 
however, the Conference Report noted the omission was not 
intended to affect the pending temporary Treasury regulation, 
which was later largely adopted as Treas. Reg. § 1.58-9: 
 
 
 Taxpayers also assert that Treas. Reg. § 1.58-9 
distorts congressional will by interfering with the operation of 
other provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.  First, taxpayers 
claim the regulation disregards the import of the regular tax 
deduction in calculating and reducing minimum tax liability under 
I.R.C. § 56(a), (c).  Because Treas. Reg. § 1.58-9 "transforms a 
suspended minimum tax in the year the nonbeneficial preferences 
arise into regular tax liability in the benefit year," Du Pont, 
102 T.C. at 15-16, the preferences from the non-benefit year are 
not being weighed against the regular tax deduction in the year 
they result in a benefit.  Yet, under the regulation, the 
preferences from the non-benefit year continue to be weighed 
against the regular tax deduction in the non-benefit year in 
calculating the amount of the suspended tax.  Furthermore, while 
the regular tax deduction appears to be an integral part of the 
minimum tax computation system of § 56, we can discern no 
(..continued) 
 
  The conferees do not intend any change 
in the scope of the authority provided in 
section 58(h) of prior law.  Thus, only those 
regulations which would have been valid under 
section 58(h) of prior law are valid under 
the conference agreement.  No inference is 
intended as to whether the regulations issued 
by the Treasury Department are valid under 
section 58(h) or prior law. 
 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 664-65 (1989), 
reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3018, 3267-68.  Thus, Congress's 
failure to approve the language cited above should not affect our 
determination as to the validity of the regulation. 
 
 
authority or evidence the regular tax deduction was meant to play 
a crucial role in the tax benefit rule of § 58(h). 
 Second, because Treas. Reg. § 1.58-9 operates to reduce 
tax credits available for use in other years, taxpayers contend 
the regulation improperly interferes with Code provisions 
governing tax credits and the regular income tax.  Although the 
regulation does affect tax credits, it does so only in limited 
circumstances to certain taxpayers, as the Tax Court noted.  
Du Pont, 102 T.C. at 19.  There is no authority suggesting the 
minimal effects of the regulation will disrupt the entire system 
of tax credits crafted by Congress or that Congress intended to 
forbid all regulations that affect tax credits in any manner.31 
 Taxpayers urge us to look to other provisions of the 
Internal Revenue Code for guidance in considering the validity of 
Treas. Reg. § 1.58-9.  Accordingly, we have examined I.R.C. § 
56(b), which until 1987 provided for deferral of minimum tax 
liability in situations involving net operating losses affected 
by preferences.  Under § 56(b), if preferences served to increase 
a net operating loss in one year, the minimum tax otherwise due 
on the preferences under § 56(a) was suspended until the year the 
preferences provided a tax benefit.  The amount of the minimum 
                     
31.   Taxpayers also complain that the regulation affects the 
balance between the regular tax and minimum tax provisions 
created by 1982 and 1984 congressional amendments to the Internal 
Revenue Code that scaled back certain preferences by specified 
percentages.  See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. (96 Stat. 324); 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 68(a), 98 
Stat. 494, 588 (1984).  We do not believe § 1.58-9 will interfere 
with the operation of these statutory changes.     
 
 
tax imposed on the preferences in this situation was calculated 
with reference to the minimum tax rate and the regular tax 
deduction for the year in which the preferences originated -- 
similar to the manner in which § 1.58-9 operates.  Du Pont, 102 
T.C. at 17-18.  We agree with the Tax Court that § 56(b) 
generally supports the rationale of Treas. Reg. § 1.58-9.  Id. at 
18. 
 Therefore, we find nothing in the legislative history 
or inferentially from other sections of the Internal Revenue Code 
that would indicate the Treasury deviated from the language or 
purpose of the statute.  What is clear is the language of § 58(h) 
that directs the Secretary to "prescribe regulations under which 
items of tax preference shall be properly adjusted."  Congress 
made a specific delegation of authority to the Secretary to 
promulgate regulations, and we may not substitute an alternative 
construction of the statute unless the regulation contravenes the 
language or purpose of the statute,32 which this regulation does 
not do. 
                     




 Since 1976, when I.R.C. § 58(h) was enacted, other 
courts have considered its meaning and scope.33  Although no 
prior cases directly confronted the validity of Treas. Reg. § 
1.58-9, taxpayers contend their position here is bolstered by the 
reasoning of First Chicago Corp. v. Commissioner, 842 F.2d 180 
(7th Cir. 1988).  In First Chicago, the taxpayer had credits 
exceeding its tax liability for the 1980 and 1981 tax years.  The 
Internal Revenue Service, however, decreed First Chicago should 
pay the minimum tax for those years on the preferences it used to 
reduce its tax liability, because those preferences freed up tax 
credits that might have been used to reduce First Chicago's 
                     
33.   For example, in Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. United 
States, 685 F.2d 1346 (Cl. Ct. 1982) (Occidental I), the Court of 
Claims considered the propriety of the minimum tax for the years 
before Congress enacted the tax benefit rule of § 58(h).  The 
court held the minimum tax was imposed regardless of whether the 
preferences actually resulted in a tax benefit.  The court also 
determined that the provisions of § 58(h) should not be applied 
retroactively to cover the years 1970-71.  In Occidental 
Petroleum Corp. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 819 (T.C. 1984) 
(Occidental II), the taxpayer's tax credits exceeded its tax 
liability for 1977, although it used its tax preferences to 
reduce the number of credits needed to offset that tax liability 
-- just as DuPont did in 1982.  In Occidental II, however, the 
taxpayer never used the tax credits freed up by the preferences; 
instead, the credits expired unused.  Nevertheless, the 
Commissioner attempted to impose the minimum tax on the taxpayer 
because, as in the present case, the taxpayer's use of the 
preferences did provide a benefit in the form of increased 
available credits for use in other years -- even if those credits 
later expired unused.  The court rejected the Commissioner's 
argument and held that the provisions of § 58(h) meant "no 
minimum tax is to be imposed where the tax preference does not 
result in a decrease of tax not only for the year under 




future tax liability.  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit disagreed, affirming the Tax Court's holding that "there 
is no minimum tax on tax-preference items until the items confer 
an actual benefit on the taxpayer."  Id. at 180.34 
 In the course of its discussion, the Seventh Circuit 
noted: 
 It is true that, as a result of Congress's 
extreme restlessness in the area of tax law, 
by the time the benefit is obtained the 
structure of taxation may have changed and 
the taxpayer may escape part or even all of 
the tax.  But this instability is built into 
tax law.  If a taxpayer is able to defer 
income to a year when tax rates are lower, he 
obtains a tax savings analogous to what First 
Chicago may someday obtain if its tax-
preference items yield a tax benefit which 
gives rise to a minimum-tax liability that it 
can offset with foreign or investment tax 
credits, thanks to the new alternative 
minimum tax.  But the deferral may backfire, 
if the structure of taxation changes against 
the taxpayer. 
Id. at 183.  This language suggests the court may have assumed 
that if the 1980-81 preferences generated a tax benefit after the 
1986 statutory changes, then they would be treated as preferences 
in that later year and be subject to the new alternative minimum 
tax, a view of § 58(h) advocated by taxpayers here. 
 But such assumptions, even if indicative of the court's 
view, cannot be persuasive here.  At the time of the decision in 
First Chicago, § 1.58-9 had not been promulgated.  In fact, the 
                     
34.   Although the Seventh Circuit rejected the Treasury's 
position, the preamble to § 1.58-9 notes the regulation is 
"[c]onsistent" with the holding of First Chicago Corp.  See T.D. 
8416, 1992-1 C.B. 7, 8. 
 
 
court decried the absence of a regulation as contributing to the 
difficulties in interpreting § 58(h).35  Once the Treasury 
Department adopted the regulation pursuant to § 58(h), the 
landscape changed.  Instead of choosing among alternative methods 
of interpreting the statute, we must inquire whether the Treasury 
regulation reasonably implements the statute.36  As we have 
noted, we believe it does. 
 D. 
 Besides challenging the substance of Treas. Reg. § 
1.58-9, taxpayers assert the regulation was enacted in "bad 
faith" and thus not entitled to judicial deference.  In support, 
taxpayers cite National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 
440 U.S. 472 (1979).  In National Muffler, the Supreme Court 
stated, in assessing the validity of regulations, courts should 
consider factors such as whether the regulation was issued 
contemporaneously with the statute, the manner in which it 
evolved, "the length of time the regulation has been in effect, 
the reliance placed on it, the consistency of the Commissioner's 
interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted 
to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of the 
statute."  Id. at 477.  Taxpayers argue the National Muffler 
factors demonstrate the regulation should be set aside.  Although 
                     
35.   First Chicago Corp., 842 F.2d at 182 ("These and other 
questions might have been answered if the Treasury Department had 
ever gotten around to promulgating regulations under section 
58(h), as ordered to do by Congress, but it never did . . . ."). 
36.   See supra section II. 
 
 
application of the National Muffler factors may not explicitly 
validate § 1.58-9, we do not find that sufficient to warrant 
striking down the regulation.37  In fact, we already have 
determined the regulation implements the statute in a "reasonable 
manner," which is all National Muffler ultimately requires and 
which is what its factors were intended to ascertain.  Id. at 
476-77 (noting that courts should defer to regulations that 
"implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner" 
and listing factors to "determin[e] whether a particular 
regulation carries out the congressional mandate in a proper 
manner").  
 Taxpayers also assert the regulation is not entitled to 
deference because the Treasury Department promulgated it in an 
                     
37.   Indeed, in National Muffler, the Treasury waited six 
years after the statute was enacted to issue any regulation and 
then substantially changed its own regulation ten years after 
that.  440 U.S. at 478-82.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
deferred to the regulation.  Id. at 488-89.     
 
 We are not persuaded that the National Muffler factors 
favor taxpayers' position here.  Although the regulation was not 
issued contemporaneously with the statute nor been long in place, 
taxpayers have not shown they detrimentally relied on any prior 
understanding of the statute.  The Commissioner's interpretation 
of the statute apparently has changed primarily because of 
judicial decisions such as Occidental II, 82 T.C. 819 (T.C. 
1984), and First Chicago Corp., 842 F.2d at 180.  See T.D. 8416, 
1992-1 C.B. 7, 8 (noting that Treas. Reg. § 1.58-9 is 
"[c]onsistent" with the holding of First Chicago).  Furthermore, 
although Congress may not have re-enacted the statute, it 
expressly noted the statute would continue to apply to the years 
preceding the repeal of § 58(h).  See supra note 11.  Finally, 
National Muffler involved an interpretative regulation issued 
under the general grant of authority of I.R.C. § 7805(a), rather 
than a regulation issued pursuant to a specific statutory 
mandate.  In view of this, the National Muffler analysis is 
somewhat less helpful. 
 
 
attempt to circumvent the 1986 change in the revenue statutes 
that permitted up to 90% of the minimum tax to be offset by 
foreign tax credits.38  In addition, taxpayers claim the Treasury 
adopted § 1.58-9 merely to enhance its litigating stance in cases 
like this. 
 As to the claim the regulation was enacted merely to 
bolster the Treasury's litigating position, one court has ruled 
that "the Commissioner may not take advantage of his power to 
promulgate retroactive regulations during the course of a 
litigation for the purpose of providing himself with a defense 
based on the presumption of validity accorded to such 
regulations."  Chock Full O' Nuts Corp. v. United States, 453 
F.2d 300, 303 (2d Cir. 1971).  Yet, as the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit noted, "[n]o case has held that the Secretary 
abused his discretion to promulgate retroactive regulations 
merely because the regulation at issue affected a legal matter 
pending before a court at the time the regulation was adopted."  
Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. United States, 562 F.2d 972, 980 (5th 
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978).  In the present 
case, there is no claim that any specific case was pending at the 
time the regulation was proposed.  Furthermore, taxpayers cite to 
                     
38.   The Tax Reform Act of 1986 replaced the add-on minimum 
tax for corporations with an alternative minimum tax for taxable 
years after 1986.  Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 
701, 100 Stat. 2085, 2320-45 (1986) (codified as amended at 
I.R.C. §§ 55-59 (1988)).  Under the old system, foreign tax 
credits could not be used to offset the minimum tax.  Under the 
new alternative minimum tax, foreign tax credits are permitted to 
offset up to 90% of the tax.  See First Chicago Corp., 842 F.2d 
at 182; I.R.C. § 55, 59(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1994). 
 
 
nothing in the record to support any of their suspicions 
regarding the Treasury Department's motives in promulgating the 
regulation, and the case was submitted to the Tax Court fully 
stipulated.  DuPont, 102 T.C. at 2. 
 IV. 
 In evaluating Treas. Reg. § 1.58-9, we are mindful of 
the Supreme Court's admonition:  "The choice among reasonable 
interpretations [of the Internal Revenue Code] is for the 
Commissioner, not the courts."  Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline, 
490 U.S. 212, 222 (1989) (quoting National Muffler Dealers Ass'n 
v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 488 (1979)).  After considering 
the regulation in light of the language of I.R.C. § 58(h), and 
the purpose behind it, we are satisfied § 1.58-9 constitutes a 
reasonable interpretation of the statute.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the judgment of the Tax Court. 
